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    The CP-style argument for Cartesian Skepticism relies on ... — Carmelics
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    Challenges→If the sensitivity requirement were accepted as a condition on knowledge, the closure principle would fail, undermining the first premise of the CP-style argument for Cartesian Skepticism

    The CP-style argument for Cartesian Skepticism relies on the closure principle as a first premise

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    Accepting the sensitivity requirement entails that closure failsIf closure fails, the basis for the first premise of the CP-style skeptical argu...If the sensitivity requirement were accepted as a condition on knowledge, the cl...

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    If closure fails, the basis for the first premise of the CP-style skep...83%The closure principle (premise 3) is false80%The closure principle's requirement to rule out all contrary hypothese...79%The closure principle requires that justification for p entails justif...78%

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    CP2 claims that we are not justified in denying the skeptical hypothesis—in other words, that we are not justified in believing that we are not being deceived. What arguments can be given for CP2? It is tempting to suggest something like this: The skeptical scenarios are developed in such a way that it is assumed that we could not tell that we were being deceived. For example, we are asked to consider that there is an Evil Genius “so powerful” that it could (1) make me believe that there were ha

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