The demand that authoritative directives be identifiable without engaging first-order reasons presupposes a sharp fact-value distinction that Dworkin's interpretivism systematically refutes.

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Authoritative directives(the subject of what the statement is analyzing): Official commands or rules that people are supposed to follow because they come from someone in power.
Dworkin(as the philosopher whose theory is being discussed): Ronald Dworkin was an influential American legal philosopher who argued that law isn't just a set of arbitrary rules, but should be understood through moral principles.
Fact-value distinction(a key philosophical divide that the statement says is being challenged): The idea that facts (what is actually true about the world) are completely separate from values (what we think is good or right).
First-order reasons(contrasted with meta-level or second-order reasoning about authority itself): Direct, practical reasons for doing something (like 'don't steal because it hurts people'), as opposed to reasons about *why* those reasons matter in the first place.

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