The disjunctive argument in P2-P4 commits a false trichotomy by excluding the Neoplatonist option that evil arises from matter's privative distance from the Good, requiring no additional soul-principle.
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Privation(Fârâbî uses privation to link deficiency to potentiality: to be deprived of F entails the potentiality to be F.)
The absence or lack of a property or perfection that a being is of the kind to possess.
Soul-principle(as used in philosophy of mind and metaphysics)
A non-physical force or essence believed to give life and consciousness to a body—in this context, an extra explanation for why evil exists.
matter(Kant's critical epistemology, agreeing with Leibniz on this point)
Not a thing in itself with mind-independent characteristics, but an appearance — objects as presented to human perception, characterized by shape, contact, and movement.
the good(Second category in Sulzer's trifold division; corresponds to Kant's class of the good)
Things that please us only if we have a distinct representation of their constitution.