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    The Downward Löwenheim-Skolem Theorem would require that ... — Carmelics
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    Supports→The Downward Löwenheim-Skolem Theorem fails for second-order logic

    The Downward Löwenheim-Skolem Theorem would require that any theory with a model has a countable model

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    Related propositions within the same area of thought.
    Second-order logic therefore has sentences with models but no countable modelsThe Downward Löwenheim-Skolem Theorem fails for second-order logicThe second-order conjunction θ_PA(U,G,z) ∧ θ_Pow(U,E) has models only of uncount...

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    This means that the Löwenheim number[4] and the Hanf number[5] of the entire second-order logic are the same as those of the fragment \(\Pi^1_1\). Summing up, upon first inspection the levels \(\Sigma^1_n\) and \(\Pi^1_n\) of the hierarchy of second-order formulas grow strictly in expressive power as n increases, but a more careful analysis reveals that already the first level \(\Sigma^1_1\cup \Pi^1_1\) has the power of all the levels \(\Sigma^1_n, \Pi^1_n\) even if the power is somewhat im

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