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    The existence of non-actual possible worlds can be suppor... — Carmelics
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    Home/Modality & Possibility
    HistoryEditSee Inverse

    The existence of non-actual possible worlds can be supported by arguing for materialism.

    Consciousness & Mind
    ?Rate how convincing each reason is below to see the overall strength.
    1 reason for
    2 reasons against

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
    ?
    • 1.Non-actual possible worlds necessarily exist (assumed for the sake of argument).
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    • 2.On the modal entailment account, if materialism is true, then the second premise of the materialism argument is true.
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    • 3.The materialism argument is necessarily truth preserving on the modal entailment account.
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    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Materialism, as a thesis about the actual world, entails no commitments about the ontological status of non-actual possible worlds.
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    • 2.Modal realism (Lewis) and materialism are logically independent doctrines: one can be a materialist nominalist who rejects possible worlds entirely.
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    • 3.Quine's extensionalist materialism explicitly denied possible worlds as ontologically profligate, showing materialism can undercut rather than support modal realism.
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    Reason against 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.The modal entailment account presupposes possible worlds semantics, making the argument circular: worlds are used to validate materialism which then validates worlds.
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    • 2.Chalmers' conceivability arguments demonstrate that materialist modal entailment fails precisely where phenomenal consciousness is concerned, undermining the modal bridge.
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    Topics

    Modality & PossibilityConsciousness & Mind

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    Related

    Chalmers' conceivability arguments demonstrate that materialist modal entailment...Materialism, as a thesis about the actual world, entails no commitments about th...Modal realism (Lewis) and materialism are logically independent doctrines: one c...Non-actual possible worlds necessarily exist (assumed for the sake of argument).
    +4 moreShow less
    On the modal entailment account, if materialism is true, then the second premise...Quine's extensionalist materialism explicitly denied possible worlds as ontologi...The materialism argument is necessarily truth preserving on the modal entailment...The modal entailment account presupposes possible worlds semantics, making the a...

    Similar

    An objection to the existence of non-actual possible worlds does not c...94%Modal realism entails that non-actual possible worlds exist, but mater...89%Non-actual possible worlds necessarily exist (assumed for the sake of ...85%Doubts about the existence of non-actual possible worlds can cast doub...84%

    Source

    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: ontological-commitment
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    Suppose, for the sake of argument, that non-actual possible worlds necessarily exist. Then the second premises, B2 and C2, are both true on the modal entailment account. Moreover, on the modal entailment account, both of these arguments are necessarily truth preserving. It seems to follow that the conclusion that non-actual possible worlds exist can be supported either by arguing for B1, that modal realism is true, or by arguing for C1, that materialism is true. But, surely, an argument for mate
    Extraction notes

    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (1 for, 2 against)
    Edits
    1 edit