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    The fact that some individual is oneself is not more reas... — Carmelics
    Home/Moral Responsibility
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    Supports→One has reason not to be indifferent to the well-being of other people

    The fact that some individual is oneself is not more reason-giving simply because that individual is oneself

    ConsequentialismMoral Responsibility
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    Moral ResponsibilityConsequentialism

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    Related propositions within the same area of thought.
    Giving greater weight to someone's good because that person is oneself is irrati...One has reason not to be indifferent to the well-being of other peopleTerms like 'me' and 'not me' point to no differences that make a rational differ...

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    AI-extracted
    SEP: altruism
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    Nagel likens the impersonal standpoint to the prudential policy of regarding all times in one’s life as equal in importance. One has reason not to be indifferent to one’s future because the present moment is not more reason-giving simply by virtue of being present. Similarly, he holds, one has reason not to be indifferent to other people, because the fact that some individual is me is not more reason-giving simply because he is me. Terms like “now” and “later, ” “me and not me” point to no diffe

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