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    The Form F is many (having many parts) — Carmelics
    Home/Modality & Possibility
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    Supports→The Form F cannot be one

    The Form F is many (having many parts)

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    Related propositions within the same area of thought.
    Anything that has many parts is ipso facto manyBy Purity-F, no form can have contrary propertiesThe Form F cannot be oneThe property of being one and the property of being many are contraries

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    We must either deny that the many Dalmatian-parts are Dalmatians, or d...85%Anything that has many parts is ipso facto many84%If the One had parts, it would be many82%Everything is either one or many82%

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    SEP: plato-parmenides
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    Although many commentators take it for granted that Parmenides’ conclusion follows from the principle that divided (or divisible) things automatically lose their unity, this supposition makes little sense in the wake of Socrates’ speech. There Socrates insisted that he himself is one (in being one among many) even though he has many parts (front and back, upper and lower, and so on). So Socrates does not suppose that it is true in general that a thing with parts cannot be one. The hypothesis tha

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