Skip to content
Carmelics
TopicsThinkersChangesContributorsLoading account…

    Carmelics

    A reasoning platform. Break down any belief into clear reasons, explore both sides, and weigh the evidence honestly.

    Navigate

    • Topics
    • Search
    • Recent Changes
    • Contribute
    • How It Works
    • Glossary
    • Thinkers
    • Contributors
    • About
    • Statistics
    • Terms
    • Privacy

    Database

    Statements
    —
    Perspectives
    —
    Topics
    —

    Press ? for keyboard shortcuts

    LoyalLoyalJusticeJustice
    Made withinDC&Austin
    The good life consists in being maximally active rather t... — Carmelics
    Statements
    321,452
    Perspectives
    108,905
    Topics
    42
    Home/Virtue Ethics
    HistoryEditSee Inverse

    Part of a larger discussion

    Supports→Ethical virtue is fundamentally epistemological

    The good life consists in being maximally active rather than passive

    ConsequentialismVirtue Ethics
    ?Rate how convincing each reason is below to see the overall strength.

    No one has weighed in yet. Be the first to share reasons for or against this statement.

    Sign in or register to share your perspective on this statement.

    Topics

    Virtue EthicsConsequentialism

    Connections

    1 topic

    Truth & Knowledge3 linked

    Related

    Next step

    Based on where you are in your exploration

    Browse more in Virtue Ethics
    Related propositions within the same area of thought.
    Being maximally active requires pursuing adequate ideas through knowledgeEthical virtue is fundamentally epistemologicalPursuing adequate knowledge is an epistemological enterprise

    Similar

    A good life involves more than maximizing pleasurable experience.81%A good human life is one that exercises one's higher capacities.79%The good life is composed of actions under headings such as honor and ...78%Being maximally active requires pursuing adequate ideas through knowle...78%

    Source

    AI-extracted
    SEP: continental-rationalism
    View source passageHide passage
    This epistemological ideal forms the core of Spinoza’s rationalistic ethics—and, hence, on one plausible account, the core of his Ethics. Spinoza’s monism entails that the sort of individuals that Aristotle regarded as primary substances are distinguished not by their own substantial unity, but by their conatus—their striving to persist. Thus, self-preservation is not just one possible goal of ethical agents; it is the very thing that makes those agents individuals. Our essence, and our ethical

    Details

    Type
    premise
    Perspectives
    0 (0 for, 0 against)
    Edits
    1 edit

    Open for perspectives

    This idea is waiting for its first supporting or challenging perspective.

    Share the first perspective