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It is not the case that The harm-prevention rationale is constrained by epistemic uncertainty: we cannot reliably predict which restrictions will actually prevent harm.
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Reasons For
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1.
Perfect certainty is impossible for any policy; demanding it paralyzes action against demonstrable harms (e.g., lead poisoning, unsafe drugs).
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2.
Some restrictions have consistent, measurable protective effects across contexts (seatbelts, vaccines, building codes), showing reliable harm-prevention works.
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3.
Uncertainty cuts both ways: we're also uncertain about harms from *not* restricting, so caution may justify preventive measures despite epistemic limits.
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Reasons Against
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Reason against
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1.
Historical restrictions often produce unintended consequences that contradict stated harm-prevention goals (e.g., drug prohibition increased violence).
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2.
Complex social systems have non-linear dynamics where interventions' effects are difficult to predict without extensive empirical testing first.
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3.
Burden of proof should require demonstrable evidence that restrictions prevent harm, not merely plausible theories about potential benefits.
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