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    The holistic contextualist view makes questions about val... — Carmelics
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    The holistic contextualist view makes questions about values of f(Q) in a P-measurement situation illegitimate.

    Modality & PossibilityTruth & Knowledge
    ?Rate how convincing each reason is below to see the overall strength.
    1 reason for
    2 reasons against

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
    ?
    • 1.On this view, f(Q)'s being well-defined is tied to a Q-measurement situation.
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    • 2.For some properties, it only makes sense to speak of them as pertaining to the system if that system is part of a certain system-apparatus whole.
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    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Scientific realism requires that observable quantities have determinate values independent of which measurement procedure we happen to select.
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    • 2.If f(Q)'s value depends entirely on the P-measurement context, then functional composition rules like FUNC become conventionally stipulated rather than physically grounded.
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    • 3.A view that makes physical quantities context-dependent in this strong sense collapses into instrumentalism, which most quantum realists explicitly reject.
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    Reason against 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Bohmian mechanics assigns definite pre-measurement values to particle positions while remaining fully contextual about other observables, showing illegitimacy claims are too sweeping.
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    • 2.If questions about f(Q) in a P-measurement context are illegitimate, pilot-wave theories that reproduce all quantum predictions are ruled out by fiat rather than by argument.
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    Related

    A view that makes physical quantities context-dependent in this strong sense col...Bohmian mechanics assigns definite pre-measurement values to particle positions ...For some properties, it only makes sense to speak of them as pertaining to the s...If f(Q)'s value depends entirely on the P-measurement context, then functional c...
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    If questions about f(Q) in a P-measurement context are illegitimate, pilot-wave ...On this view, f(Q)'s being well-defined is tied to a Q-measurement situation.Scientific realism requires that observable quantities have determinate values i...

    Similar

    The holistic contextualist view that f(Q) is well-defined only given a...91%This position does not reject questions about values of f(Q) in a P-me...81%Questions about values of f(Q) in the P-measurement situation are ther...81%On this view, f(Q)'s being well-defined is tied to a Q-measurement sit...79%

    Source

    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: kochen-specker
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    (a) We might think that v(f(Q)) just is not a self-sustained physical property, but one which ontologically depends on the presence of another property v(Q). (Recall that in the proof of FUNC v(f(Q)) is constructed from v(Q).) But, since the position does not reject questions about values of f(Q) in a P-measurement situation as illegitimate (because it does not trade on a notion of an observable being well-defined in one context only!), this seems to lead to new and pressing questions, to say t
    Extraction notes

    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (1 for, 2 against)
    Edits
    1 edit