The identity reduction witnessing reflexivity is trivially well-defined only if problems are individuated extensionally as sets of strings, collapsing intensional distinctions philosophers like Carnap and Frege treat as meaningful.

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Extensionally(as used in logic and semantics): Treating something based on what it actually is or what group it belongs to, rather than how we describe it. If something can't be 'handled extensionally,' it means we can't just look at what it actually contains or is.
Gottlob Frege(historical philosopher): A late 19th and early 20th-century German philosopher and logician who made fundamental contributions to understanding how language and meaning work.
Identity reduction(as used in metaphysics and philosophy of mind): A philosophical technique where you try to show that one thing is really just another thing in disguise—like arguing that the mind is really just the brain.
Intensional distinctions(what mereological extensionality fails to distinguish): Differences in meaning or how something is understood, rather than differences in what physical parts or objects are involved.

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