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    The impression that emotions have intentional objects is ... — Carmelics
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    Home/Perception
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    Supports→Emotions are feelings devoid of intentional objects

    The impression that emotions have intentional objects is an illusion

    Consciousness & MindPerception
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    PerceptionConsciousness & Mind

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    Emotions and intentional thoughts are associated in a 'composite' experience, ma...Emotions are feelings devoid of intentional objectsThe feelings we call emotions are typically caused by thoughts with an intention...

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    Emotions are feelings devoid of intentional objects82%In order to account for the intentionality of emotions, emotions must ...82%The feelings we call emotions are typically caused by thoughts with an...79%Bodily sensations do not have an intentional object in the way percept...79%

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    An alternative embraced by some contemporary feeling theorists is to argue that emotions are feelings devoid of any intentional objects. The contrary impression is an illusion, deriving from the fact that the feelings we call emotions are typically caused by thoughts with an intentional structure with which they are associated in a “composite” experience (Whiting 2011; Goldstein 2002). On this view, fear of the ice is a composite mental state consisting of an emotion—the objectless feeling of fe

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