Skip to content
Carmelics
TopicsThinkersChangesContributorsLoading account…

    Carmelics

    A reasoning platform. Break down any belief into clear reasons, explore both sides, and weigh the evidence honestly.

    Navigate

    • Topics
    • Search
    • Recent Changes
    • Contribute
    • How It Works
    • Glossary
    • Thinkers
    • Contributors
    • About
    • Statistics
    • Terms
    • Privacy

    Database

    Statements
    —
    Perspectives
    —
    Topics
    —

    Press ? for keyboard shortcuts

    LoyalLoyalJusticeJustice
    Made withinDC&Austin
    Statements
    321,452
    Perspectives
    108,905
    Topics
    42
    The 'long arm' functionalist theory is false, because fun... — Carmelics
    Home/Consciousness & Mind
    HistoryEditSee Inverse

    The 'long arm' functionalist theory is false, because functional role is not sufficient for determining quale identity.

    Consciousness & Mind
    ?Rate how convincing each reason is below to see the overall strength.
    2 reasons for
    1 reason against

    Reasons For

    2 perspectives
    Reason for 1 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Ned Block's distinction between access consciousness and phenomenal consciousness establishes that functional role tracks the former, not the latter.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 2.If phenomenal consciousness is conceptually distinct from access consciousness, then no purely relational-causal story can fix phenomenal character.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 3.Therefore, 'long arm' functional role, however broadly construed, remains silent on which phenomenal quality is instantiated.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    Reason for 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Frank Jackson's Mary argument shows that complete physical-functional knowledge leaves phenomenal facts unknown, implying qualia are not functionally reducible.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 2.If Mary learns something new upon seeing red for the first time, the quale Q_R carries information no functional description — proximal or distal — encodes.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 3.An Inverted Earth subject whose functional role is externally anchored to red objects still lacks Q_R, confirming functional role underdetermines quale identity.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    Reasons Against

    1 perspective
    Reason against
    ?
    • 1.On Inverted Earth, an experience is caused by red things, used in thought about red things, and guides action with respect to red things — satisfying the functionalist's necessary and sufficient conditions for possessing Q_R.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 2.Yet that experience has Q_G (the quale of green), not Q_R (the quale of red), on Inverted Earth.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 3.Therefore, functional role of the type specified by 'long arm' functionalism does not determine which quale an experience has.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    Sign in or register to share your perspective on this statement.

    Next step

    Based on where you are in your exploration

    Strongest counterpoint
    Explore the most compelling reason on the other side.

    Topics

    Consciousness & Mind

    Related

    An Inverted Earth subject whose functional role is externally anchored to red ob...Frank Jackson's Mary argument shows that complete physical-functional knowledge ...If Mary learns something new upon seeing red for the first time, the quale Q_R c...If phenomenal consciousness is conceptually distinct from access consciousness, ...
    +5 moreShow less
    Ned Block's distinction between access consciousness and phenomenal consciousnes...On Inverted Earth, an experience is caused by red things, used in thought about ...Therefore, 'long arm' functional role, however broadly construed, remains silent...Therefore, functional role of the type specified by 'long arm' functionalism doe...Yet that experience has Q_G (the quale of green), not Q_R (the quale of red), on...

    Similar

    Therefore, functional role of the type specified by 'long arm' functio...84%It does not show that the specific qualitative character of individual...76%The functionalist thesis holds that functional identity entails mental...75%Anti-functionalist physicalists lack a principled reason to reject inv...75%

    Source

    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: qualia-inverted
    View source passageHide passage
    This gives us an apparent counterexample against the “long arm” functionalist theory. On Inverted Earth your experiences have the functional role that the functionalist theory says is necessary and sufficient for possessing \(Q_{R}\): they are “caused by red things in the right circumstances, and used in thought about red things and action with respect to red things rightly”. But on Inverted Earth your experiences with this functional role have \(Q_{G}\), not (or not always) \(Q_{R}\).
    Extraction notes

    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (2 for, 1 against)
    Edits
    1 edit