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    Carmelics

    A reasoning platform. Break down any belief into clear reasons, explore both sides, and weigh the evidence honestly.

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    LoyalLoyalJusticeJustice
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    Home/Original/inverse
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    Inverse View

    It is not the case that The mainstream premise that consciousness is intrinsically intentional is false.

    ?Set your confidence on the premises below to see your aggregate.

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
    ?
    • 1.If consciousness were intrinsically intentional, consciousness could not exist without intentional experience.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 2.Consciousness persists in deep sleep where there is no intentional experience.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 3.Therefore consciousness is not intrinsically intentional.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Pure witnessing awareness (Shankara's sakshi) is self-luminous consciousness that illuminates intentional acts without itself being directed at any object.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 2.Husserl's own analyses reveal a pre-reflective background awareness that enables intentionality but is not itself structured as subject-pole directed toward object-pole.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 3.If consciousness were the precondition for intentionality rather than a species of it, then intentionality is a contingent feature consciousness can possess, not its intrinsic nature.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    Reason against 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Ned Block's phenomenal consciousness (P-consciousness) is characterized by qualitative 'what it is like' character entirely distinct from representational or access functions.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 2.Inverted and absent qualia thought experiments demonstrate that phenomenal character can vary independently of any intentional or representational content.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 3.If phenomenal consciousness is conceptually separable from intentionality in these cases, then intentionality cannot be intrinsic to consciousness as such.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

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