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    LoyalLoyalJusticeJustice
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    The mere possibility of compensation does not constitute ... — Carmelics
    Home/Justice & Punishment
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    Challenges→Kaldor's compensation criterion has dubious ethical value when compensatory transfers are not actually performed

    The mere possibility of compensation does not constitute actual welfare improvement for the losers

    ConsequentialismJustice & Punishment
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    Justice & PunishmentConsequentialism

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    If compensatory transfers are not performed, the losers remain losersKaldor's compensation criterion has dubious ethical value when compensatory tran...

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    SEP: economic-justice
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    The proponents of a “new” welfare economics (Hicks, Kaldor, Scitovsky) have distanced themselves from their predecessors (Marshall, Pigou, Lerner) by abandoning the idea of making social welfare judgments on the basis of interpersonal comparisons of utility. Their problem was then that in absence of any kind of interpersonal comparisons, the only principle on which to ground their judgments was the Pareto principle, according to which a situation is a global improvement if it is an improvement f

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