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    The notion of difference does not imply the notion of non... — Carmelics
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    The notion of difference does not imply the notion of non-identity.

    Modality & PossibilityTruth & Knowledge
    ?Rate how convincing each reason is below to see the overall strength.
    1 reason for
    2 reasons against

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
    ?
    • 1.Difference and real identity are logically compatible.
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    • 2.There are degrees in distinction, and these degrees can be read as the inverse measure of partial identity between two things.
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    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Leibniz's Identity of Indiscernibles holds that numerically distinct entities must differ in at least one intrinsic property.
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    • 2.If difference always tracks some property-divergence, then difference is necessarily grounded in non-identity of properties.
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    • 3.Therefore, difference and non-identity are not conceptually separable but mutually implicated at the level of substance.
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    Reason against 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Frege's extensional criterion of identity stipulates that terms refer identically if and only if they share all the same referents or values.
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    • 2.Any genuine difference in reference or predicate-satisfaction between two terms entails they are non-identical in the logically relevant sense.
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    • 3.Distinguishing 'difference' from 'non-identity' collapses when identity is understood functionally rather than metaphysically.
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    Related

    Any genuine difference in reference or predicate-satisfaction between two terms ...Difference and real identity are logically compatible.Distinguishing 'difference' from 'non-identity' collapses when identity is under...Frege's extensional criterion of identity stipulates that terms refer identicall...
    +4 moreShow less
    If difference always tracks some property-divergence, then difference is necessa...Leibniz's Identity of Indiscernibles holds that numerically distinct entities mu...There are degrees in distinction, and these degrees can be read as the inverse m...Therefore, difference and non-identity are not conceptually separable but mutual...

    Similar

    If no such identity statement can be true, then every perceived differ...81%Intertheoretic identity statements express the fact that two different...79%All ontological differences are categorial articulations of being, not...78%Philosophical distinctions involve differences in concepts without cor...78%

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    Penbygull (De universalibus, pp. 189–90) had (1) distinguished between the notion of non-identity and that of difference (or distinction); (2) denied that the notion of difference implies that of non-identity; (3) affirmed that the two notions of difference and real identity are logically compatible, thus admitting that (3.1) there are degrees in distinction, and (3.2) that the degrees of distinction between two things can be read as the inverse measure of their (partial) identity; and (4) sugge
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    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (1 for, 2 against)
    Edits
    1 edit