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Inverse View
It is not the case that The notion of explanatory power of mathematics in science has no ontological import and cannot be used in the enhanced indispensability argument.
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Reasons For
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Reason for
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1.
Alternative mathematical explanations of the same scientific phenomenon exist, appealing to different mathematical entities.
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2.
If multiple distinct mathematical entities can explain the same phenomenon, no single entity's existence is established by that explanatory role.
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Reasons Against
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Reason against 1 of 2
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1.
Mathematical explanations function as representational tools that reveal structural relationships, not as causal mechanisms that produce phenomena (Pincock 2012).
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2.
Representational adequacy requires only that mathematical structures be applicable, not that the entities they describe exist independently (Balaguer 1998).
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3.
The enhanced indispensability argument conflates inferential utility with existential commitment, a distinction Azzouni's deflationary nominalism systematically upholds.
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Reason against 2 of 2
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1.
If mathematical entities were ontologically implicated by explanatory power, replacing one mathematical framework with an equivalent one would alter the ontology of science, which is absurd (Field 1980).
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2.
The existence of provably equivalent mathematical redescriptions of the same phenomenon—as in Euler's bridges and graph-theoretic reformulations—entails that explanatory success tracks modal structure, not particular abstract objects.
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