Skip to content
Carmelics
TopicsThinkersChangesContributorsLoading account…

    Carmelics

    A reasoning platform. Break down any belief into clear reasons, explore both sides, and weigh the evidence honestly.

    Navigate

    • Topics
    • Search
    • Recent Changes
    • Contribute
    • How It Works
    • Glossary
    • Thinkers
    • Contributors
    • About
    • Statistics
    • Terms
    • Privacy

    Database

    Statements
    —
    Perspectives
    —
    Topics
    —

    Press ? for keyboard shortcuts

    LoyalLoyalJusticeJustice
    Made withinDC&Austin
    Statements
    321,452
    Perspectives
    108,905
    Topics
    42
    The objects described in [v] do not exist necessarily — Carmelics
    Home/Divine Attributes
    HistoryEditSee Inverse

    The objects described in [v] do not exist necessarily

    Divine AttributesModality & Possibility
    ?Rate how convincing each reason is below to see the overall strength.
    1 reason for
    2 reasons against

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
    ?
    • 1.The objects described in [v] do not follow from God's nature
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 2.The modal transfer principle requires necessity to derive from God's nature
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 3.The only available source for the necessity of finite modes is God's nature
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Finite modes follow necessarily from God's nature via infinite intermediate modes, preserving modal transfer through mediate causation.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 2.Spinoza's Ethics 1p28 establishes that finite modes are causally necessitated through the infinite chain of finite causes grounded in God.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 3.A necessitation that is mediate rather than immediate still counts as deriving necessity from God's nature under the modal transfer principle.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    Reason against 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Leibniz's principle of sufficient reason entails that any contingent object requires an external sufficient reason, collapsing into necessity given an omniscient God.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 2.If God's intellect comprehends all possible objects described in [v], their existence is determined by God's will, making them necessary relative to divine decrees.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    Sign in or register to share your perspective on this statement.

    Next step

    Based on where you are in your exploration

    Strongest counterpoint
    Explore the most compelling reason on the other side.

    Topics

    Divine AttributesModality & Possibility

    Related

    A necessitation that is mediate rather than immediate still counts as deriving n...Finite modes follow necessarily from God's nature via infinite intermediate mode...If God's intellect comprehends all possible objects described in [v], their exis...Leibniz's principle of sufficient reason entails that any contingent object requ...
    +4 moreShow less
    Spinoza's Ethics 1p28 establishes that finite modes are causally necessitated th...The modal transfer principle requires necessity to derive from God's natureThe objects described in [v] do not follow from God's natureThe only available source for the necessity of finite modes is God's nature

    Similar

    The objects described in [v] do not follow from God's nature87%There are non-existent objects.84%Propositions are abstract objects that exist necessarily.81%Presentism holds that only present objects exist80%

    Source

    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: spinoza-modal
    View source passageHide passage
    The objects described in [v] do not follow from God’s nature at all, in which case the modal transfer principle will not be satisfied. Insofar as that is the only available source for their necessity, it follows that they do not exist necessarily. But what is the difference between the objects described in [iv] and the objects described in [v]? In one sense, nothing: they are the same finite modes! That cannot be the full story, however, lest there be no explanation why the modes in [iv] follow
    Extraction notes

    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (1 for, 2 against)
    Edits
    1 edit