Skip to content
Carmelics
TopicsThinkersChangesContributorsLoading account…

    Carmelics

    A reasoning platform. Break down any belief into clear reasons, explore both sides, and weigh the evidence honestly.

    Navigate

    • Topics
    • Search
    • Recent Changes
    • Contribute
    • How It Works
    • Glossary
    • Thinkers
    • Contributors
    • About
    • Statistics
    • Terms
    • Privacy

    Database

    Statements
    —
    Perspectives
    —
    Topics
    —

    Press ? for keyboard shortcuts

    LoyalLoyalJusticeJustice
    Made withinDC&Austin
    Statements
    321,452
    Perspectives
    108,905
    Topics
    42
    The ontological structure of the truth-maker of a true se... — Carmelics
    Home/Divine Attributes
    HistoryEditSee Inverse

    Part of a larger discussion

    Supports→The fact that sentences (3) and (4) have the form 'a is F' does not warrant the conclusion that their respective truth-makers have the structure: particular-exemplifying-same universal.

    The ontological structure of the truth-maker of a true sentence cannot be read off from the syntactic structure of the sentence of which it is the truth-maker.

    Divine Attributes
    ?Rate how convincing each reason is below to see the overall strength.

    No one has weighed in yet. Be the first to share reasons for or against this statement.

    Sign in or register to share your perspective on this statement.

    Topics

    Divine Attributes

    Related

    Not all predicates express properties (Armstrongian immanent universals).Predicates and their senses provide no sure guidance as to what properties the w...The fact that sentences (3) and (4) have the form 'a is F' does not warrant the ...

    Similar

    Next step

    Based on where you are in your exploration

    Browse more in Divine Attributes
    Related propositions within the same area of thought.
    A truthmaker of a truth t is an entity whose existence broadly logical...79%The fact that sentences (3) and (4) have the form 'a is F' does not wa...71%What is created is ontologically dependent on its creator70%Therefore T is not the set of all truths; the assumption that it is le...70%

    Source

    AI-extracted
    SEP: divine-simplicity
    View source passageHide passage
    Oppy is not denying that many predicates express properties; he is denying that all do. Taking a page from David Armstrong (1978), he is saying that predicates and their senses provide no sure guidance as to what properties (Armstrongian immanent universals) the world contains. It follows that the ontological structure of the truth-maker of a true sentence cannot be read off from the syntactic structure of the sentence of which it is the truth-maker. Therefore, the fact that our two sentences (3) and (4) have the form a is F does not warrant the conclusion that the respective truth-makers have...

    Details

    Type
    premise
    Perspectives
    0 (0 for, 0 against)
    Edits
    1 edit

    Open for perspectives

    This idea is waiting for its first supporting or challenging perspective.

    Share the first perspective