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    Carmelics

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    Made withinDC&Austin
    Statements
    321,452
    Perspectives
    108,905
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    42
    Home/Original/inverse
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    Inverse View

    It is not the case that The Phaedrus argument for immortality applies only to self-moving soul, a property Aristotle and his tradition explicitly deny to nutritive soul.

    ?Set your confidence on the premises below to see your aggregate.

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
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    • 1.Aristotle's nutritive soul may possess a form of intrinsic activity (energeia) distinct from Platonic self-motion, making the distinction less absolute than claimed.
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    • 2.The claim conflates Aristotle's specific metaphysical framework with the logical scope of Platonic arguments, potentially attributing Aristotle's conclusions to Plato unfairly.
      ?

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    • 3.Even granting Aristotle's denial, this shows Aristotelian incompatibility with Platonism rather than proving the original Phaedrus argument's logical structure unsound.
      ?

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    Reasons Against

    1 perspective
    Reason against
    ?
    • 1.Plato's immortality argument in Phaedrus explicitly requires self-motion as the defining essence of soul, which is metaphysically distinct from life-giving.
      ?

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    • 2.Aristotle systematically denies self-motion to nutritive soul, treating it as a passive capacity dependent on external matter and bodily organization.
      ?

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    • 3.If nutritive soul lacks self-motion, Platonic immortality arguments that depend on self-motion cannot validly extend to vegetative functions or their souls.
      ?

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