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Inverse View
It is not the case that The phenomenal character of an experience is fully determined by the intrinsic neural states of the subject, not by external objects.
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Reasons For
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1.
Phenomenal character includes intentionality—what experience is *of*—which depends on external relational properties, not just neural states.
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2.
Two subjects with identical neural states but different historical causal relations to objects have different phenomenal contents (externalism).
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3.
Perceptual experiences have intrinsic modal properties (realness vs. hallucination) that track actual external objects, not neural states alone.
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Reasons Against
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Reason against
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1.
Identical neural states in two subjects produce identical subjective experiences regardless of their external environment.
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2.
Brain-in-a-vat and normally-embodied subjects with identical neural activity have qualitatively identical phenomenal experiences.
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3.
External objects causally influence experience only by altering neural states; the objects themselves add nothing intrinsic to phenomenology.
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