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    Carmelics

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    LoyalLoyalJusticeJustice
    Made withinDC&Austin
    Statements
    321,452
    Perspectives
    108,905
    Topics
    42
    Home/Original/inverse
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    Inverse View

    It is not the case that The possibilist commitments of an intended KQML interpretation cannot be eliminated by the fact that the sentence 'there exist things that are not actual' is false at every world in KQML

    ?Set your confidence on the premises below to see your aggregate.

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
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    • 1.In KQML, the sentence asserting that there are non-actual things is false at every world due to quantifier restrictions
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    • 2.A metalinguistic fact about the ontological commitments of an interpretation is not expressible within the object language governed by that interpretation's semantics
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    • 3.The falsity of a sentence within a formal system does not entail the non-existence of the entities to which the interpretation is committed at the metalinguistic level
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    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
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    • 1.Kripke's possible worlds semantics requires that the domain function D assign objects to worlds, and those objects must exist in the metatheory regardless of which world is designated actual.
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    • 2.The union of all domains across worlds in a varying-domain model constitutes an ontological commitment to possibilia at the semantic level, as Lewis's distinction between inner and outer quantifiers establishes.
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    • 3.What a formal system is committed to is determined by its model-theoretic interpretation, not by which sentences are true within it—Quine's criterion applies to theories, not their internal sentences.
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    Reason against 2 of 2
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    • 1.Fine's work on arbitrary objects shows that semantic values assigned in a model can outrun what the object language can express, creating irreducible metatheoretic commitments.
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    • 2.If KQML's intended interpretation assigns non-actual possibilia as semantic values to terms or as domain elements, actualist paraphrase within the object language leaves those assignments intact.
      ?

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