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    LoyalLoyalJusticeJustice
    Made withinDC&Austin
    Statements
    321,452
    Perspectives
    108,905
    Topics
    42
    Home/Original/inverse
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    Inverse View

    It is not the case that The prisoner's dilemma provided a unifying model for representing collective action failures across the social sciences.

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    Reasons For

    2 perspectives
    Reason for 1 of 2
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    • 1.The prisoner's dilemma requires that defection be a dominant strategy, but many collective action failures (e.g., assurance games, stag hunts) lack this property.
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    • 2.Schelling (1960) and Sen (1967) demonstrated that coordination problems with multiple equilibria have a fundamentally different logic than prisoner's dilemmas.
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    • 3.Collapsing structurally distinct interaction types into one model obscures the different institutional remedies each requires, undermining the claim of unification.
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    Reason for 2 of 2
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    • 1.Elinor Ostrom's empirical work showed that communities routinely solve collective action problems without the defection logic the prisoner's dilemma predicts as dominant.
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    • 2.Ostrom argued that the prisoner's dilemma framework imports assumptions of fixed preferences and no communication that distort rather than represent real collective action situations.
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    • 3.A model that systematically mispredicts outcomes in the cases it purports to unify lacks the explanatory authority required to serve as a genuine unifying framework.
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    Reasons Against

    1 perspective
    Reason against
    ?
    • 1.Samuelson (1954), Hardin (1968), and Olson (1965) each independently identified cases where a common interest among individuals failed to produce incentives for collectively beneficial action.
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    • 2.The prisoner's dilemma game matrix offers a simple yet powerful formal structure.
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    • 3.That formal structure can represent the logic underlying all such collective action failure interactions.
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