Skip to content
Carmelics
TopicsThinkersChangesContributorsLoading account…

    Carmelics

    A reasoning platform. Break down any belief into clear reasons, explore both sides, and weigh the evidence honestly.

    Navigate

    • Topics
    • Search
    • Recent Changes
    • Contribute
    • How It Works
    • Glossary
    • Thinkers
    • Contributors
    • About
    • Statistics
    • Terms
    • Privacy

    Database

    Statements
    —
    Perspectives
    —
    Topics
    —

    Press ? for keyboard shortcuts

    LoyalLoyalJusticeJustice
    Made withinDC&Austin
    Statements
    321,452
    Perspectives
    108,905
    Topics
    42
    The quantifier account of ontological commitment should b... — Carmelics
    Home/Philosophy of Language
    HistoryEditSee Inverse

    The quantifier account of ontological commitment should be rejected by ontologists.

    Philosophy of Language
    ?Rate how convincing each reason is below to see the overall strength.
    2 reasons for
    1 reason against

    Sign in or register to share your perspective on this statement.

    Next step

    Based on where you are in your exploration

    Strongest counterpoint
    Explore the most compelling reason on the other side.

    Reasons For

    2 perspectives
    Reason for 1 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Quine's criterion ties ontological commitment to first-order existential quantification, but natural language and scientific discourse routinely quantify over fictional, modal, and abstract entities without thereby asserting their mind-independent existence.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 2.If quantifying over Fs in our best theory commits us to Fs, then standard physics commits us to the existence of the average star, which has 2.4 planets—an entity no serious ontologist should posit.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 3.A criterion that cannot distinguish ontological weight from mere quantificational convenience conflates the semantic role of variables with the metaphysical question of what genuinely exists.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    Reason for 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Kit Fine and Jonathan Schaffer argue that ontology's central question is not 'what exists?' but 'what is fundamental?'—a question grounded-entity theorists show cannot be read off from existential quantification alone.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 2.Two theories can have identical quantificational commitments yet differ radically in their grounding structure, meaning the quantifier account is blind to the ontological hierarchy that metaphysicians like Fine take to be the subject matter of ontology.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    Reasons Against

    1 perspective
    Reason against
    ?
    • 1.There is a primitive distinction between entities that are fundamentally real and those that are not, marked by the predicate 'Real(x)'.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 2.The ontologist's task is to determine which entities and kinds of entity are fundamentally real.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 3.The quantifier account is insensitive to the distinction between fundamentally real and non-fundamentally-real entities.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    Topics

    Philosophy of LanguageTruth & Knowledge

    Connections

    1 topic

    Modality & Possibility1 linked

    Related

    A criterion insensitive to the distinction the ontologist is trying to track is ...A criterion that cannot distinguish ontological weight from mere quantificationa...If quantifying over Fs in our best theory commits us to Fs, then standard physic...Kit Fine and Jonathan Schaffer argue that ontology's central question is not 'wh...
    +5 moreShow less
    Quine's criterion ties ontological commitment to first-order existential quantif...The ontologist's task is to determine which entities and kinds of entity are fun...The quantifier account is insensitive to the distinction between fundamentally r...There is a primitive distinction between entities that are fundamentally real an...Two theories can have identical quantificational commitments yet differ radicall...

    Similar

    The quantifier account of ontological commitment is not sufficient as ...93%The quantifier account of ontological commitment should not be require...92%The quantifier account and the entailment account of ontological commi...90%The quantifier criterion of ontological commitment rests on the object...90%

    Source

    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: ontological-commitment
    View source passageHide passage
    Fine has argued, however, that qua ontologists we do need to look elsewhere.[21] Suppose, with Fine, that there is a primitive distinction between those entities that are “fundamentally real”, and those that are not. Let ‘Real(x)’ be a predicate that marks this distinction. (Unlike the Meinongian existence predicate considered in §1.7.3, this predicate is not derived from a special quantifier.) The ontologist's task, then, is to determine which entities and kinds of entity are fundamentally re
    Extraction notes

    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (2 for, 1 against)
    Edits
    1 edit