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    The senses can inform us about the sensible world, even i... — Carmelics
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    Supports→Plutarch's defense of suspension of judgment does not amount to a dismissal of the senses

    The senses can inform us about the sensible world, even if not about being itself

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    Plutarch holds that the senses have limited application, not that they are worth...Plutarch's defense of suspension of judgment does not amount to a dismissal of t...

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    The senses can only inform us about the sensible world94%The senses serve a life-preserving role rather than a truth-revealing ...83%The senses serve the function of knowing the essences of things.83%Knowable and sensible things are spoken of relatively not because they...82%

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    Like the Hellenistic Philosophers and Antiochus, Plutarch appears to be particularly sensitive to the question of how we acquire knowledge. Plutarch sets out to defend the interpretation of Plato's epistemology maintained in the skeptical Academy. According to this interpretation, suspension of judgment (epochê) is the best way to avoid overhasty commitment to opinions (doxai), since the appearances on which they are based can be deceitful. Plutarch defends this epistemological position against

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