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    The standard criterion of ontological commitment (premise... — Carmelics
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    Supports→Nominalists can reject the standard criterion of ontological commitment as a strategy for handling true mathematical sentences.

    The standard criterion of ontological commitment (premise 1) implies that true sentences about objects require those objects to exist.

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    How can nominalists proceed in developing an account of sentences like ‘3 is prime’? One strategy is to reject premise (1) and the standard criterion of ontological commitment discussed above. The most obvious way to do this is to endorse the following view: (a) simple mathematical sentences like ‘3 is prime’ should be read as being of the form ‘a is F' and as being about abstract objects (e.g., ‘3’ should be taken as denoting the number 3, which could only be an abstract object, and ‘3 is prime

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