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    The substantive content of a given agent's reasons is a f... — Carmelics
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    Home/Moral Responsibility
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    Supports→There are no universal rational norms that bind all rational agents

    The substantive content of a given agent's reasons is a function of that agent's particular, contingently given, evaluative starting points

    Moral ResponsibilityTruth & Knowledge
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    There are no universal rational norms that bind all rational agentsTruth and falsity in the normative domain must always be relativized to a partic...

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    Motivating reasons are the reasons that would figure as premises in a ...86%For an agent to have a reason, the agent must know or believe the cons...83%The agent's reason is what is known or believed, namely a putative fac...81%If a consideration cannot explain an agent's action, it cannot be a ge...81%

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    The case for Humean constructivism rests on the alleged inadequacy of competing views: “it is what we are forced to by the untenability of realism plus the failure of Kantian versions of metaethical constructivism” (Street 2010: 371). Humean constructivism denies that normative truths are independent of the deliverances of practical reasoning (Bagnoli 2002: 131; Street 2008a, 2010, 2012; Velleman 2009; Lenman 2010, 2012). To this extent, Humean constructivism builds on the Kantian insight that n

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