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    The supporting argument illicitly conflates functional-di... — Carmelics
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    Challenges→Two levels of discourse A and B are more-than-causally connected only if one entails the other a priori

    The supporting argument illicitly conflates functional-dispositional properties like waterish behavior with intrinsic qualitative properties like phenomenal character, which resist a priori derivation.

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    Key Terms

    A priori derivation(as used in epistemology (theory of knowledge))
    Figuring something out through pure reasoning or logic alone, without needing to observe the world or have experience—like how you can know 2+2=4 just by thinking about it.
    Functional-dispositional properties(as used in philosophy of mind)
    Characteristics of something defined by what it does or how it behaves in certain situations, rather than what it's made of—like how 'fragile' means something breaks easily, not what atoms compose it.
    Illicit conflation(as used in logic and argumentation)
    Wrongly treating two different things as if they're the same thing when they actually aren't—a logical mistake where the argument sneaks in a false equation.
    Intrinsic qualitative properties(as used in philosophy of mind)
    The fundamental, inner nature of something that exists independently of what it does—like the redness of red or the painfulness of pain, which seem to exist just by themselves.

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    phenomenal character(Used to distinguish the mere presence of experience from the specific qualitative nature of individual experiences)
    The qualitative, subjective 'what it is like' aspect of mental states; the property of having qualia

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    Causation1 linkedModality & Possibility1 linked

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    Two levels of discourse A and B are more-than-causally connected only if one ent...

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