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    The supporting argument's dissolution of inconsistency vi... — Carmelics
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    Challenges→Hybrid ontological objects (intersections of mental, abstract, and physical categories) are metaphysically permissible

    The supporting argument's dissolution of inconsistency via equivocation-diagnosis itself presupposes that 'mental', 'abstract', and 'physical' lack determinate extension, which undermines rather than licenses hybrid posits.

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    1 reason for
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    Reasons For

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    Reason for
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    • 1.Equivocation-diagnosis requires stable meanings to identify ambiguity; unclear category boundaries undermine this diagnostic capacity itself.
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    • 2.Hybrid positions (e.g., property dualism) presume determinate mental-physical distinction; indeterminate boundaries make such hybridity incoherent.
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    • 3.Arguments that solve inconsistency by exploiting semantic vagueness smuggle in clarity elsewhere, creating masked rather than resolved contradictions.
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    Reasons Against

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    Reason against
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    • 1.Practical indeterminacy at boundaries need not entail total lack of extension; 'physical' remains stable enough for philosophical purposes despite gray cases.
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    • 2.Hybrid posits can be defended without claiming perfect category precision—many viable theories operate with fuzzy but workable conceptual divisions.
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    • 3.The claim conflates semantic indeterminacy with ontological incoherence; unclear language doesn't automatically defeat substantive metaphysical positions.
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    Key Terms

    Equivocation(Lewis diagnoses the ontological argument as equivocating on 'a being than which nothing greater can be conceived is possible'.)
    A fallacy in which a key term or phrase is used in two different senses within the same argument, making an invalid inference appear valid.
    Presupposes(as describing what Plantinga's argument takes for granted)
    Assumes something to be true without proving it—like how an argument might presuppose that logic works, without first arguing that logic is valid.
    determinate extension(as used in philosophy of language and metaphysics)
    Having clear, definable boundaries—knowing exactly what things count as examples of something and what doesn't.
    dissolution of inconsistency(as used in logic and argumentation)
    A way of solving a logical problem where two ideas seem to contradict each other by showing they're not actually in conflict.
    equivocation-diagnosis(as used in philosophical argumentation)
    Identifying and pointing out when someone has used a word ambiguously to try to solve a logical problem.
    hybrid posits(as used in metaphysics and philosophy of mind)
    Proposed concepts or things that mix together different categories (like mixing mental and physical) that might not naturally belong together.
    mental, abstract, and physical(as used in metaphysics and philosophy of mind)
    Three fundamental categories philosophers use: mental (thoughts and feelings), abstract (things that exist as ideas rather than objects), and physical (material objects in the world).

    Connections

    2 topics

    Modality & Possibility1 linkedPhilosophy of Language1 linked

    Related

    Arguments that solve inconsistency by exploiting semantic vagueness smuggle in c...Equivocation-diagnosis requires stable meanings to identify ambiguity; unclear c...

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    2 (1 for, 1 against)
    Edits
    1 edit
    Hybrid ontological objects (intersections of mental, abstract, and physical cate...
    Hybrid positions (e.g., property dualism) presume determinate mental-physical di...
    +3 moreShow less
    Hybrid posits can be defended without claiming perfect category precision—many v...Practical indeterminacy at boundaries need not entail total lack of extension; '...The claim conflates semantic indeterminacy with ontological incoherence; unclear...