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    The truth-makers of assertions predicating logical intent... — Carmelics
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    Home/Philosophy of Language
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    The truth-makers of assertions predicating logical intentions are thoughts.

    Philosophy of Language
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    1 reason for
    2 reasons against

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
    ?
    • 1.Assertions of the form 'S is P' involve the relevant mode of being of the significate of the predicate.
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    • 2.In assertions where logical intentions are predicated (e.g., belonging to a species or genus), the relevant mode of being of the predicate is mental existence.
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    • 3.If the relevant mode of being of a predicate is mental existence, then the truth-makers are thoughts.
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    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Logical intentions like 'species' and 'genus' track real structural features of the world, not merely mental classifications (Porphyry, Avicenna).
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    • 2.If universals have foundation in re, then assertions predicating them are made true by mind-independent structures, not thoughts alone.
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    • 3.A truth-maker theory grounded purely in mental existence cannot account for why logical predications constrain inference across minds.
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    Reason against 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Ockham's razor demands that positing mental existence as truth-maker is redundant if the singular things themselves suffice to ground predication.
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    • 2.For Ockham, 'Socrates is a species' is false or improper precisely because species-terms refer to mental acts, making such assertions fail rather than succeed via thought.
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    Philosophy of LanguageTruth & Knowledge

    Related

    A truth-maker theory grounded purely in mental existence cannot account for why ...Assertions of the form 'S is P' involve the relevant mode of being of the signif...For Ockham, 'Socrates is a species' is false or improper precisely because speci...If the relevant mode of being of a predicate is mental existence, then the truth...
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    If universals have foundation in re, then assertions predicating them are made t...In assertions where logical intentions are predicated (e.g., belonging to a spec...Logical intentions like 'species' and 'genus' track real structural features of ...Ockham's razor demands that positing mental existence as truth-maker is redundan...

    Similar

    If the relevant mode of being of a predicate is mental existence, then...82%In assertions where logical intentions are predicated (e.g., belonging...81%The truth-makers of essential predications are the quiddities signifie...81%Frege holds that thoughts are true or false absolutely, not relative t...80%

    Source

    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: simon-faversham
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    The latter claim is shown as follows: assertions of the form ‘S is P’[8] involve the relevant mode of being of the significate of the predicate (henceforth ‘of the predicate’). In assertions where real accidents are predicated (e.g., being white, running, etc.), the relevant mode of being of the predicate is actual existence; therefore, their truth-makers must be real things in the external world (Ebbesen 1987: 160). Likewise, in assertions where logical intentions are predicated (e.g., belong
    Extraction notes

    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (1 for, 2 against)
    Edits
    1 edit