Skip to content
Carmelics
TopicsThinkersChangesContributorsLoading account…

    Carmelics

    A reasoning platform. Break down any belief into clear reasons, explore both sides, and weigh the evidence honestly.

    Navigate

    • Topics
    • Search
    • Recent Changes
    • Contribute
    • How It Works
    • Glossary
    • Thinkers
    • Contributors
    • About
    • Statistics
    • Terms
    • Privacy

    Database

    Statements
    —
    Perspectives
    —
    Topics
    —

    Press ? for keyboard shortcuts

    LoyalLoyalJusticeJustice
    Made withinDC&Austin
    The truth of what is said by a T-sentence is compatible w... — Carmelics
    Statements
    321,452
    Perspectives
    108,905
    Topics
    42
    Home/Philosophy of Language
    HistoryEditSee Inverse

    Part of a larger discussion

    Challenges→Knowing what is said by a truth theory is not sufficient for understanding a language

    The truth of what is said by a T-sentence is compatible with the sentence used on the right-hand side being materially equivalent to but different in meaning from the sentence mentioned on the left

    Philosophy of LanguageTruth & Knowledge
    ?Rate how convincing each reason is below to see the overall strength.

    No one has weighed in yet. Be the first to share reasons for or against this statement.

    Sign in or register to share your perspective on this statement.

    Topics

    Philosophy of LanguageTruth & Knowledge

    Key Terms

    Meaning (vs. truth value)(as used in philosophy of language)
    The concept or idea that a sentence expresses, which is different from whether that sentence is true or false—two sentences can say the same true thing in completely different ways.
    Right-hand side / Left-hand side(as used in formal logic and philosophy of language)
    In a T-sentence formula, the left-hand side is the sentence being discussed (in quotation marks), and the right-hand side is what it supposedly means or when it's true.

    Next step

    Based on where you are in your exploration

    Browse more in Philosophy of Language
    Related propositions within the same area of thought.
    T-sentence(Davidsonian semantics)
    A sentence produced by a Tarskian truth theory; makes no explicit claims about meaning or content, but specifies truth conditions for sentences of the object language
    materially equivalent(Russell's usage in his 1893 paper for Sidgwick)
    mean the same as

    Related

    If a truth theory's T-sentences can be satisfied by materially equivalent but se...Knowing what is said by a truth theory is not sufficient for understanding a lan...

    Similar

    If a truth theory's T-sentences can be satisfied by materially equival...81%Two sentences can express different propositions while having the same...79%Disquotationalism faces a serious objection because it restricts truth...79%Sentence meaning does not simply combine with facts to determine truth...79%

    Source

    AI-extracted
    SEP: meaning
    View source passageHide passage
    but still not know the meaning of the sentence mentioned on the left-hand side of the T-sentence. The truth of what is said by this sentence, after all, is compatible with the sentence used on the right-hand side being materially equivalent to, but different in meaning from, the sentence mentioned on the left. This seems to indicate that knowing what is said by a truth theory of the relevant kind is not, after all, sufficient for understanding a language. (For replies to these criticisms, see Da

    Details

    Type
    premise
    Perspectives
    0 (0 for, 0 against)
    Edits
    1 edit

    Open for perspectives

    This idea is waiting for its first supporting or challenging perspective.

    Share the first perspective