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    Carmelics

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    LoyalLoyalJusticeJustice
    Made withinDC&Austin
    Statements
    321,452
    Perspectives
    108,905
    Topics
    42
    Home/Original/inverse
    See Original
    Inverse View

    It is not the case that The Wager would not get off the ground even if rationality merely permits, rather than requires, refraining from assigning a probability to God's existence.

    ?Set your confidence on the premises below to see your aggregate.

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
    ?
    • 1.Pascal's Wager presupposes that one should have a probability for God's existence.
      ?

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    • 2.Rationality may permit agents to leave their probability for God's existence undefined.
      ?

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    • 3.If an agent permissibly refrains from assigning a probability to God's existence, the Wager cannot compel that agent.
      ?

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    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Agents who permissibly withhold probability assignments face genuine decision-theoretic indeterminacy, not merely incomplete information.
      ?

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    • 2.Under indeterminacy, no expected utility calculation is well-defined, so the Wager's infinite expected utility argument produces no action-guiding output.
      ?

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    • 3.A wager that generates no determinate recommendation fails on its own decision-theoretic terms, regardless of whether abstention is required or merely permitted.
      ?

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    Reason against 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Levi's epistemology of belief establishes that rational agents may maintain credal committees—sets of permissible probability functions—rather than point-valued credences.
      ?

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    • 2.When a credal committee includes both zero and nonzero probabilities for God's existence, the expected utility of wagering is undefined across that committee.
      ?

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    • 3.The Wager requires a dominated-options argument to get started, but dominance reasoning collapses when the probability space itself is permissibly unresolved.
      ?

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