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    The worry raised by Laudan's argument can be rephrased in... — Carmelics
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    The worry raised by Laudan's argument can be rephrased in terms of the mistaken ontologies of past theories from later perspectives

    SkepticismTruth & Knowledge
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    1 reason for
    2 reasons against

    Reasons For

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    Reason for
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    • Realism may be defined in terms of scientific ontology rather than reference and truth
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    Reasons Against

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    Reason against 1 of 2
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    • 1.Structural realism preserves mathematical relations across theory change even when ontological posits are radically revised or abandoned.
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    • 2.Laudan's pessimistic induction targets entity-level ontology, which structural realists explicitly do not commit to as the locus of scientific success.
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    • 3.If realist commitment is cashed out in structural rather than entity terms, mistaken ontologies of past theories do not constitute refutations of realism.
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    Reason against 2 of 2
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    • 1.Kitcher and Psillos distinguish idle posits from working posits, arguing only the latter genuinely explain predictive success.
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    • 2.Historical theories with mistaken ontologies often succeeded via working posits that were retained or approximated in successor theories.
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    • 3.Reformulating realism around working posits dissolves Laudan's challenge without requiring retreat to purely ontology-neutral definitions.
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    Related

    Historical theories with mistaken ontologies often succeeded via working posits ...If realist commitment is cashed out in structural rather than entity terms, mist...Kitcher and Psillos distinguish idle posits from working posits, arguing only th...Laudan's pessimistic induction targets entity-level ontology, which structural r...
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    Realism may be defined in terms of scientific ontology rather than reference and...Reformulating realism around working posits dissolves Laudan's challenge without...Structural realism preserves mathematical relations across theory change even wh...

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    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: scientific-realism
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    Contemporary discussion commonly focuses on Laudan’s (1981) argument to the effect that the history of science furnishes vast evidence of empirically successful theories that were later rejected; from subsequent perspectives, their unobservable terms were judged not to refer and thus, they cannot not be regarded as true or even approximately true. (If one prefers to define realism in terms of scientific ontology rather than reference and truth, one may rephrase the worry in terms of the mistaken
    Extraction notes

    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (1 for, 2 against)
    Edits
    1 edit