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    Theoretical exercises of reason cannot be morally commanded — Carmelics
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    Home/Moral Responsibility
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    Supports→We do not have a duty to believe in God

    Theoretical exercises of reason cannot be morally commanded

    Moral ResponsibilityNatural Theology
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    Moral ResponsibilityNatural Theology

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    Browse more in Moral Responsibility
    Related propositions within the same area of thought.
    Our duty to promote the highest good gives rise only to a need of reason to assu...Postulating God's existence is a theoretical exercise of reasonWe do not have a duty to believe in God

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    Fundamental moral principles cannot be arrived at through reasoning, a...81%Humans ought to employ reason in the pursuit of morality81%Reason cannot be the motive to moral action81%The rules of morality are not conclusions of reason80%

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    SEP: kant-hume-morality
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    The relation between God and the highest good is the basis of Kant’s main argument for belief in God. (See Wood 1970.) The argument, most clearly articulated in the Critique of Practical Reason, goes like this (CPrR 5:110–14, 124–46). The moral law issues categorical demands through each agent’s own reason. If the moral law sets forth an end for us to promote, we must promote it. For our promotion of this end to be rational, the end must be one that we can rationally view as possible for us to p

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