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    Carmelics

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    LoyalLoyalJusticeJustice
    Made withinDC&Austin
    Statements
    321,452
    Perspectives
    108,905
    Topics
    42
    Home/Original/inverse
    See Original
    Inverse View

    It is not the case that There is a deep problem for perfect being theology regarding the co-realizability of divine freedom and divine moral goodness.

    ?Set your confidence on the premises below to see your aggregate.

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
    ?
    • 1.Moral goodness is a great-making feature that God must exhibit.
      ?

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    • 2.God must be free.
      ?

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    • 3.God must be perfectly morally good.
      ?

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    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Under libertarian free will, genuinely free choices require the agent could have chosen otherwise, including choosing evil.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 2.A being who cannot choose evil lacks the alternative possibilities libertarianism requires for moral responsibility.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 3.Therefore, a perfectly good God who necessarily avoids evil cannot be free in the libertarian sense, generating a genuine co-realizability tension.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    Reason against 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Kant and Leibniz distinguish between acting from inclination and acting from rational autonomy, but divine necessity collapses this distinction for God.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 2.If God's nature necessitates only good choices, God's 'decisions' are determined outputs of divine nature, not autonomous rational acts in any robust sense.
      ?

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    • 3.Frankfurt-style compatibilism cannot rescue divine freedom here because it still requires higher-order volitions that could, in principle, endorse alternatives.
      ?

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    Explore the most compelling reason on the other side.