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    There is evidence for theism — Carmelics
    Home/Natural Theology
    HistoryEditSee Inverse

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    Supports→Belief in theism is justified, though not with full certainty

    There is evidence for theism

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    Natural Theology

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    Truth & Knowledge3 linkedSkepticism1 linked

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    Belief in theism is justified, though not with full certaintyProbable evidence can justify belief even without guaranteeing the conclusionThe evidence for theism is probable rather than conclusive

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    The evidence for theism is probable rather than conclusive89%Omni-theism is very probably false85%Arguments that individually fall short of demonstrating theism is like...83%The hope that theism is true is a sufficient reason to believe in thei...82%

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    SEP: religion-epistemology
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    Many natural theologians have, however, abandoned the search for demonstrative arguments, appealing instead to ones which are probable, either in the sense of having weight but being inconclusive or in the sense of having a mathematical probability assigned to them. Notable in this regard are Mitchell’s cumulative argument (Mitchell 1973) and Swinburne’s Bayesian reliance on probability (Swinburne 1979). In a popular exposition of his argument Swinburne appeals instead to an inference to the bes

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