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    There is little or no room for the idea that S misunderst... — Carmelics
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    Home/Philosophy of Language
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    There is little or no room for the idea that S misunderstands a concept.

    Philosophy of Language
    ?Rate how convincing each reason is below to see the overall strength.
    1 reason for
    2 reasons against

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
    ?
    • 1.To understand a concept is simply to possess it and use it in thoughts.
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    • 2.If S reasons as if she possesses a different concept (e.g., ancient rather than arcane), it follows not that she misuses a concept but that she has another concept.
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    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Wittgenstein's rule-following considerations show that concept use is normatively constrained by community practice, not just individual dispositions.
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    • 2.A speaker can deviate from the communally established norm for a concept while still intending to deploy that very concept, constituting genuine misunderstanding.
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    • 3.Therefore, misunderstanding is possible precisely when individual use diverges from the normative standard the concept is constitutively tied to.
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    Reason against 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Frege's distinction between sense and reference entails that grasping a concept requires grasping its inferential and semantic role, not merely associating a term with uses.
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    • 2.A speaker who systematically draws wrong inferences from a concept (e.g., treating 'prime' as including 1) has failed to grasp the concept's constitutive sense, not merely acquired a different one.
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    Topics

    Philosophy of LanguageTruth & Knowledge

    Related

    A speaker can deviate from the communally established norm for a concept while s...A speaker who systematically draws wrong inferences from a concept (e.g., treati...Frege's distinction between sense and reference entails that grasping a concept ...If S reasons as if she possesses a different concept (e.g., ancient rather than ...
    +3 moreShow less
    Therefore, misunderstanding is possible precisely when individual use diverges f...To understand a concept is simply to possess it and use it in thoughts.Wittgenstein's rule-following considerations show that concept use is normativel...

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    Source

    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: meaning-normativity
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    This argument runs parallel to the argument from understanding in support of ME normativity (section 2.1.2). Even if that argument is accepted, however, the question arises whether it can be applied to concepts and content, since the notion of failing to use a concept in “keeping with its content” appears more problematic than the notion of failing to use a word in accordance with its meaning (McGinn 1984: 146–147; Millar 2004: 180–181). It is relatively unproblematic to speak of understanding
    Extraction notes

    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (1 for, 2 against)
    Edits
    1 edit