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    There is little reason to prefer Ginsborg's partial reduc... — Carmelics
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    There is little reason to prefer Ginsborg's partial reductionism over non-reductionism or reductionism

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    Reasons For

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    • 1.Ginsborg's 'primitive normativity' posits a sui generis normative fact that is neither reduced nor fully explained, leaving the explanatory gap intact.
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    • 2.Boghossian's dilemma shows any account must either reduce normative facts or accept them as primitive; Ginsborg's middle path collapses into the latter.
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    • 3.A position that inherits the costs of both reductionism and non-reductionism without gaining their respective advantages offers no net theoretical gain.
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    Reason for 2 of 2
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    • 1.Kripke's skeptical argument targets the very idea that any fact, partial or full, can constitute meaning; Ginsborg's partial reduction still invokes such constitutive facts.
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    • 2.If partial reduction cannot satisfy the normativity constraint Kripke identifies, it fails on the same grounds as full naturalistic reductions like dispositional accounts.
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    Reasons Against

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    • Ginsborg's partial reductionism faces the same challenges raised against non-reductionism and reductionism
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    Related

    A position that inherits the costs of both reductionism and non-reductionism wit...Boghossian's dilemma shows any account must either reduce normative facts or acc...Ginsborg's 'primitive normativity' posits a sui generis normative fact that is n...Ginsborg's partial reductionism faces the same challenges raised against non-red...
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    If partial reduction cannot satisfy the normativity constraint Kripke identifies...Kripke's skeptical argument targets the very idea that any fact, partial or full...

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    Ginsborg's partial reductionism faces the same challenges raised again...89%At least one crucial aspect of Kelsen's anti-reductionism is questiona...80%Schaffner's criticism of Enç for assuming that reduction is causation ...77%A view committed only to normative reduction does not satisfy both con...76%

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    SEP: meaning-normativity
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    Miller (2019) and Sorgiovanni (2018) also raise concerns about the viability of Ginsborg’s “primitive” rule-following. In particular, Miller (2019) points out that her argument for why rules do not guide agents, is based on the (mistaken, and disproven by Wittgenstein himself) assumption that being guided by a rule necessarily requires interpreting that rule (2019: 746).[41] What’s more, Miller takes issue with her primitive normativity by claiming that the attitude of “taking-to-be-appropriat
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    3 (2 for, 1 against)
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    1 edit