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    There is no compelling reason to expect players to choose... — Carmelics
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    Home/Consequentialism
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    There is no compelling reason to expect players to choose NE, SPE, or sequential-equilibrium strategies across wide ranges of social interactions.

    ConsequentialismTruth & Knowledge
    ?Rate how convincing each reason is below to see the overall strength.
    2 reasons for
    1 reason against

    Reasons For

    2 perspectives
    Reason for 1 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Herbert Simon's bounded rationality thesis establishes that agents optimize under cognitive constraints, not against idealized equilibrium benchmarks.
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    • 2.Kahneman and Tversky's prospect theory demonstrates systematic deviations from expected utility maximization that equilibrium concepts presuppose.
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    • 3.If the psychological foundations of NE require full rationality that actual agents lack, NE loses normative grip across realistic social interactions.
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    Reason for 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Wittgenstein's rule-following considerations show that no finite behavior uniquely determines a rational strategy rule, undermining convergent equilibrium predictions.
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    • 2.Brian Skyrms's evolutionary game theory shows that populations converge on correlated equilibria via learning dynamics, not NE via individual deliberation.
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    • 3.The actual coordinating force in social interaction is salience and convention, as Schelling demonstrated, not Nash-optimal calculation.
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    Reasons Against

    1 perspective
    Reason against
    ?
    • 1.NE and SPE are brittle solution concepts sensitive to other players' learning states.
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    • 2.Bayesian principles cannot ground rational play in large worlds.
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    • 3.Without a viable general theory of strategic rationality, the normative basis for expecting equilibrium play collapses.
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    Topics

    ConsequentialismTruth & Knowledge

    Connections

    2 topics

    Skepticism1 linkedMoral Responsibility1 linked

    Related

    Bayesian principles cannot ground rational play in large worlds.Brian Skyrms's evolutionary game theory shows that populations converge on corre...Herbert Simon's bounded rationality thesis establishes that agents optimize unde...If the psychological foundations of NE require full rationality that actual agen...
    +5 moreShow less
    Kahneman and Tversky's prospect theory demonstrates systematic deviations from e...NE and SPE are brittle solution concepts sensitive to other players' learning st...The actual coordinating force in social interaction is salience and convention, ...

    Similar

    A player has no reason to play a Nash equilibrium strategy unless she ...85%Rational play of a Nash equilibrium strategy presupposes that other pl...81%A sequential equilibrium has two parts: a strategy profile for each pl...81%Unless players have previously experienced play at equilibrium with on...80%

    Source

    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: game-theory
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    Given his work’s vintage, Lewis restricted his attention to static game theory, in which agents are modeled as deliberately choosing strategies given exogenously fixed utility-functions. As a result of this restriction, his account invited some philosophers to pursue a misguided quest for a general analytic theory of the rationality of conventions (as noted by Bickhard 2008). Though Binmore has criticized this focus repeatedly through a career’s worth of contributions (see the references for a
    Extraction notes

    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    Without a viable general theory of strategic rationality, the normative basis fo...
    Wittgenstein's rule-following considerations show that no finite behavior unique...
    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (2 for, 1 against)
    Edits
    1 edit