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    There is no direct argument from experience to the A-theo... — Carmelics
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    Home/Skepticism
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    There is no direct argument from experience to the A-theory of time.

    SkepticismTruth & Knowledge
    ?Rate how convincing each reason is below to see the overall strength.
    2 reasons for
    1 reason against

    Reasons For

    2 perspectives
    Reason for 1 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Husserl's phenomenology shows that experienced 'now' is a retentional-protentional structure, not an instantaneous present.
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    • 2.A-theory requires a privileged, instantaneous 'now' that advances through time, which no phenomenal datum directly reveals.
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    • 3.Because the experienced present is constitutively extended and relational, it underdetermines the metaphysical thesis that one moment is objectively NOW.
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    Reason for 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.The B-theorist can explain temporal phenomenology—the felt passage and asymmetry of time—without positing an objective moving present (cf. Mellor, 'Real Time II').
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    • 2.When a theory's explanatory target is fully accountable by a rival theory, experience of that target cannot serve as an argument for the first theory over the second.
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    • 3.Therefore, the phenomenology of passage gives no differential evidential weight to A-theory over B-theory.
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    Reasons Against

    1 perspective
    Reason against
    ?
    • 1.The present of experience is temporally extended and concerns the past.
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    • 2.The objective present postulated by the A-theory is very different from the present of experience.
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    SkepticismTruth & Knowledge

    Connections

    2 topics

    Consciousness & Mind2 linkedPerception2 linked

    Related

    A-theory requires a privileged, instantaneous 'now' that advances through time, ...Because the experienced present is constitutively extended and relational, it un...Husserl's phenomenology shows that experienced 'now' is a retentional-protention...The B-theorist can explain temporal phenomenology—the felt passage and asymmetry...
    +4 moreShow less
    The objective present postulated by the A-theory is very different from the pres...The present of experience is temporally extended and concerns the past.Therefore, the phenomenology of passage gives no differential evidential weight ...

    Similar

    Intuition of time and space is independent of experience, not derived ...77%If there is no present time, perception has no temporal basis in which...76%Aristotle's treatment of time demonstrates that whether time exists re...76%B-theories of time hold that propositions have their truth-values eter...75%

    Source

    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: time-experience
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    What is clear, though, is that there is no direct argument from experience to the A-theory, since the present of experience, being temporally extended and concerning the past, is very different from the objective present postulated by the A-theory. Further, it cannot be taken for granted that the objective passage of time would explain whatever it is that the experience as-of time’s passage is supposed to amount to. (See Prosser 2005, 2007, 2012, 2016, 2018.)
    Extraction notes

    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    When a theory's explanatory target is fully accountable by a rival theory, exper...
    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (2 for, 1 against)
    Edits
    1 edit