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    Carmelics

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    There is no such thing as material substance. — Carmelics
    Home/Modality & Possibility
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    There is no such thing as material substance.

    Consciousness & MindModality & Possibility
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    1 reason against

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    • 1.To be a real substance, something must be 'truly one' — a genuine unity.
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    • 2.To be a genuine unity, something must be simple and indivisible.
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    • 3.Matter is extended and therefore infinitely divisible.
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    Modality & PossibilityConsciousness & Mind

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    Matter is extended and therefore infinitely divisible.To be a genuine unity, something must be simple and indivisible.To be a real substance, something must be 'truly one' — a genuine unity.What is infinitely divisible cannot be a genuine unity.

    Similar

    Bucephalus is not a substance but a collection of simple substances83%Leibniz denies that matter can constitute a real substance.83%Human beings are not purely material things.81%Bodies, as material aggregates, are not substances because aggregates ...81%

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    SEP: leibniz-mind
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    Leibniz’s opposition to Cartesian dualism stems not from a rejection of unextended substance, but from his denial of the existence of genuine extended material substance. To begin with, Leibniz held the Scholastic thesis that “being” and “one” are equivalent. He writes to Arnauld: “To be brief, I hold as axiomatic the identical proposition which varies only in emphasis: that what is not truly one being is not truly one being either” (30 April 1687; G II, 97/LA 121). For Leibniz, in order for som
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    claim
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    1 (0 for, 1 against)
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    1 edit