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There must be a thing (a truthmaker) that makes each trut... — Carmelics

Statements: 321,452
Perspectives: 108,905
Topics: 42

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There must be a thing (a truthmaker) that makes each truth true.

Truth & Knowledge

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1 reason for

2 reasons against

Reasons For

1 perspective

Reason for

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1.Truth obtains in virtue of word-to-world relations.
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2.The ontological aspect of the neo-classical correspondence theory requires not merely word-to-world relations but an entity grounding each truth.
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Reasons Against

2 perspectives

Reason against 1 of 2

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1.Frege and Ramsey demonstrated that 'it is true that p' is logically redundant, adding no content beyond the assertion of p itself.
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2.If truth ascriptions are redundant rather than relational, there is no explanatory gap that a truthmaker entity needs to fill.
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3.A deflationary account of truth is thus parsimony-preserving in a way that truthmaker theory, which multiplies ontological commitments beyond necessity, is not.
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Reason against 2 of 2

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1.Negative truths (e.g., 'there are no unicorns') have no plausible candidate entity to serve as their truthmaker.
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2.Any posited truthmaker for negative truths—such as totality facts or absences—is ontologically more problematic than the original commitment to correspondence warrants.
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Related

A deflationary account of truth is thus parsimony-preserving in a way that truth...Any posited truthmaker for negative truths—such as totality facts or absences—is...Frege and Ramsey demonstrated that 'it is true that p' is logically redundant, a...If truth ascriptions are redundant rather than relational, there is no explanato...

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Negative truths (e.g., 'there are no unicorns') have no plausible candidate enti...The ontological aspect of the neo-classical correspondence theory requires not m...Truth obtains in virtue of word-to-world relations.

Similar

All truths are true in virtue of something distinct from them (they re...86%A truth-maker must match the propositional structure of what it makes ...85%The truthmakers for a theory are entities whose existence is sufficien...84%Only entities with real existence can be truthmakers.83%

Source

AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid

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The truthmaker principle expresses the ontological aspect of the neo-classical correspondence theory. Not merely must truth obtain in virtue of word-to-world relations, but there must be a thing that makes each truth true. (For one view on this, see Merricks (2007).)

Extraction notes

Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

Details

Type: claim

Perspectives

3 (1 for, 2 against)

Edits