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    Therefore a and c remain B-indiscernible despite a having... — Carmelics
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    Challenges→Klagge's objection does not succeed in showing that w and w* fail to counterexample strong supervenience of A on B

    Therefore a and c remain B-indiscernible despite a having P# and c lacking P#

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    Related propositions within the same area of thought.
    Klagge's conclusion that w and w* are not a counterexample would only follow if ...Klagge's objection does not succeed in showing that w and w* fail to counterexam...Paull and Sider stipulate that B contains only intrinsic properties P and QThe property P# is not in set B, so differing on P# does not make a and c B-disc...

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    Klagge (1995) objected to this line of argument. He pointed out that Paull and Sider include an extrinsic property M in the supervenient set A, but only intrinsic properties P and Q in the subvenient or base set B. And, he claimed, if we allow that there are the sorts of property-forming operations required to construct extrinsic property M, then Paull and Sider have not exhaustively characterized worlds w and w*. For, given those property-forming operations, it is plausible that there will, for

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