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It is not the case that Therefore, F and G can be materially equivalent yet remain distinct concepts, falsifying the claim that distinct concepts cannot be materially equivalent.
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Reasons For
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Reason for
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1.
If F and G refer to identical objects in all possible worlds, they possess the same conceptual content by Frege's criterion of sense.
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2.
Psychological differences in concept deployment reflect epistemic limitations, not genuine conceptual distinction in the object itself.
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3.
Identity of necessary and sufficient conditions entails identity of concepts; otherwise 'distinct concepts' becomes unfalsifiably vague.
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Reasons Against
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Reason against
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1.
Water and H2O are materially identical yet distinct concepts formed through different discovery routes and conceptual frameworks.
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2.
Concepts are individuated by their cognitive role and mode of presentation, not solely by extensional reference.
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3.
Material equivalence concerns truth-conditions; conceptual distinctness concerns how we cognitively represent those conditions.
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