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    Therefore, Leibniz's account cannot ground all real possi... — Carmelics
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    Challenges→Leibniz's account of the grounding of possibilities is inadequate for grounding real (non-logical) possibilities.

    Therefore, Leibniz's account cannot ground all real possibilities.

    Modality & PossibilityNatural Theology
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    Natural TheologyModality & Possibility

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    Related propositions within the same area of thought.
    Leibniz held that all possibilities are grounded in God's thinking them rather t...Leibniz's account can only ground possibilities that are distinguished by the pr...Leibniz's account of the grounding of possibilities is inadequate for grounding ...Some real possibilities and impossibilities are not grounded in the principle of...

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    Kant’s version of the argument is based on the claim that there are real possibilities that are not grounded in the principle of non-contradiction, but that nevertheless must have a ground or explanation (Kant 1763 [AK 2: 63ff]). If they are not grounded in the principle of non-contradiction, then they are not grounded in God’s thinking them rather than their negations, which is how Leibniz had proposed that all such possibilities are grounded. Put the other way around, Kant thinks that some imp

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