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It is not the case that Therefore, representation theorems provide a rationality-constitutive, not merely pragmatic, justification for probabilism.
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Reasons For
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Reason for
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1.
Representation theorems rely on idealized assumptions (infinite bets, perfect information) disconnected from actual rational agents.
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2.
Showing that violating probabilism enables Dutch books demonstrates pragmatic vulnerability, not conceptual incoherence in rationality itself.
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3.
Rationality might constitute multiple coherent credence systems; probabilism's necessity doesn't follow from minimal consistency requirements alone.
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Reasons Against
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Reason against
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1.
Representation theorems show that violating probabilism necessarily leads to exploitable inconsistency in belief structure.
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2.
If rationality requires internal logical consistency, and probabilism is entailed by consistency, then probabilism is rationality-constitutive.
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3.
Unlike pragmatic justifications, rationality-constitutive norms apply regardless of practical consequences or betting scenarios.
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