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    These feelings facilitate the performance of moral duties — Carmelics
    Home/Moral Responsibility
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    Supports→Feelings such as gratitude and sympathy are morally relevant even though feelings cannot be morally required

    These feelings facilitate the performance of moral duties

    Moral ResponsibilityVirtue Ethics
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    Moral ResponsibilityVirtue Ethics

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    Feelings such as gratitude and sympathy are morally relevant even though feeling...Kant holds that feelings cannot be required of anyoneYet adopting others' happiness as an end naturally produces feelings of gratitud...

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    SEP: moral-character
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    That virtue is a form of continence for Kant is also suggested by his treatment of other traits such as gratitude and sympathy. Although Kant thinks that feelings cannot be required of anyone, some feelings are nevertheless associated with the moral ends we adopt. If we adopt others’ happiness as an end, we will not take malicious pleasure in their downfall. On the contrary, we will naturally feel gratitude for their benevolence and sympathy for their happiness. These feelings will make it easie

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