This 'Cambridge change' problem, articulated by Geach and implicit in Ockham's skepticism about real relations, shows that monadic accident accounts cannot distinguish genuine relational change from mere Cambridge change.

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Cambridge change(Socrates's becoming shorter than Simmias solely because Simmias grew taller is the paradigm example given.): A change that a thing undergoes solely in virtue of a change in something else, without any intrinsic alteration in the thing itself.
Peter Geach(as a key figure in this debate about logical formalism): A 20th-century British philosopher who studied logic and language, and argued that formal logic sometimes fails to capture how we actually speak.
Real relations(one side of the distinction Aquinas made): A connection between two things that actually exists and affects how those things are, not just how we think about them.
William Ockham(as a historical philosopher whose ideas are referenced): A medieval philosopher (1287-1347) famous for the principle 'Occam's Razor' (don't multiply explanations unnecessarily); he was skeptical about whether relationships between things are real or just products of our thinking.

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