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    This grounding establishes the existence of objects indep... — Carmelics
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    Challenges→Berkeley's denial and Descartes' doubt of the existence of objects ontologically distinct from our representations are both refuted.

    This grounding establishes the existence of objects independent of our representations.

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    Berkeley's denial and Descartes' doubt of the existence of objects ontologically...Our phenomenologically spatial representations are grounded in something ontolog...

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    The grounding principle cannot itself be established by any argument.82%Unionism is the thesis that grounding and grounding explanation are id...80%Separatism is the thesis that grounding and grounding explanation are ...79%The grounding principle must be immediately certain and synthetic.79%

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    Spatiality may be acknowledged to be only my way of representing things outside me, but insofar as anything in space is used to determine the order of my own representations it must be regarded as being ontologically distinct from my representations of it even if its phenomenology is subjective, that is, even if spatiality is only our way of representing ontological independence (see A 22/B 37). In this way Kant proves, contra Berkeley who denies it and Descartes who doubts it, that our phenomen

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