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    Toulmin's biological species analogy is not a genuine ana... — Carmelics
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    Toulmin's biological species analogy is not a genuine analogy to biological species

    Philosophy of Language
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    2 reasons for
    1 reason against

    Reasons For

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    Reason for 1 of 2
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    • 1.Mayr's Biological Species Concept defines species by reproductive isolation and shared gene pools, not by functional or structural similarity.
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    • 2.Toulmin's 'intellectual disciplines' lack any equivalent to reproductive isolation—concepts migrate freely across disciplinary boundaries.
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    • 3.Without a mechanism analogous to reproductive isolation, Toulmin's units cannot exhibit the bounded variation that defines genuine biological species.
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    Reason for 2 of 2
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    • 1.Kitcher's population-based account of scientific change shows that conceptual lineages require traceable descent with modification, not mere typological resemblance.
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    • 2.Toulmin identifies his 'intellectual species' by synchronic functional roles rather than diachronic genealogical descent, inverting the logic of cladistic classification.
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    Reasons Against

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    • 1.Toulmin's biological species analogy is based only on feature-similarity between scientific communities and biological species
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    • 2.Genuine biological species are defined by historical-causal continuity, not mere feature-similarity
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    Related

    Genuine biological species are defined by historical-causal continuity, not mere...Kitcher's population-based account of scientific change shows that conceptual li...Mayr's Biological Species Concept defines species by reproductive isolation and ...Toulmin identifies his 'intellectual species' by synchronic functional roles rat...
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    Toulmin's 'intellectual disciplines' lack any equivalent to reproductive isolati...Toulmin's biological species analogy is based only on feature-similarity between...Without a mechanism analogous to reproductive isolation, Toulmin's units cannot ...

    Similar

    Toulmin's biological species analogy is based only on feature-similari...90%The Kripke-Putnam account of natural kind essentialism does not straig...78%Watson's analogy assumes genes are the primary causal agents analogous...77%An acceptable analogy provides defeasible grounds for taking a scienti...77%

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    SEP: rationality-historicist
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    Donald Campbell (1960, 1974) had previously defended the generalized variation plus selective retention schema, which he traced back to William James. Popper regarded his own evolutionary account of scientific development as similar to Campbell’s (1974). Ditto for David Hull (1988) with his more detailed evolutionary model. However, Hull rejected evolutionary epistemology, as such, and denied that he was doing epistemology at all. (Evolutionary epistemologies face the problem of why we should ex
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    Details

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    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (2 for, 1 against)
    Edits
    1 edit